Date of the talk: 21 February 2014, 10h30-11h30, salle Petri/Turing
Exploiting Side-Channel Traces: the Impact of Computing PowerAs far as side-channel attacks are concerned, adversaries and security evaluations do not really perform intensive computations: they mainly evaluate attacks in terms of the number of side-channel traces. An adversary is usually allowed to try a single key, when the computational security threshold in classical cryptanalysis is at least 2^80. We introduce methods and algorithms for computer intensive post-processing of side-channel traces that allow an adversary to exploit the computing power at his/her disposal. It is now possible to try a large number of keys in optimal order, in order to increase the probability of a successful key recovery (enumeration). Conversely, we show how an evaluator can take the computing power into account when estimating the side-channel susceptibility of a device (key rank estimation).